Le Collimateur: Le putsch d'Alger, une tragédie française [Le Fil de l'Épée #4]

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Hello everyone and welcome to the Fille de l'épée, a podcast dedicated to the history of war and armed conflicts.

A co-production between the collimator and the word of the story.

I'm Alexandre Dublain and I'm happy to meet you, André Loez, for this new episode of this format,

dedicated today to one of the most structural events in French military history.

So maybe in general, I believe certainly in the 20th century,

one of those that have had more consequences for French armies for more than 60 years now,

namely the attempt of the general's pouches in April 1961, which lasted 4 days and 5 nights in Algeria.

Thank you Alexandre, and to talk about it, we have today the pleasure of receiving Maurice Weiss.

Hello.

Hello.

You are professor of history and international relations at Sciences Po Paris.

You published in 2021 at Odile Jacob the Alger's Pouch,

which is actually an opening that also has its own history,

because it is the third edition after the first one in 1982 and will come back in 2011.

So obviously it's a gigantic pouch, with memorable implications,

institutional, military, political, considerable.

If we come back to the event itself, do we know who had the first idea of this pouch?

We know who made it, we know who was in his head,

and we will undoubtedly come back to this general Charles and the problems he poses,

but do we know where this idea came from, who was the first to have this idea of making a pouch?

Everyone will want to re-vendicate the idea, and no one, at the same time.

In reality, I mean, I don't think there was the idea of making a pouch,

there was simply the idea of re-making the 13th May, which was a pouch, precisely,

so the pouch...

So the 13th May 1958, the events of Alger that lead to the power of the general...

Exactly.

The great model for the Pouchists of 1971 is the 13th May.

And it's one of the reasons for which it fails, because they believe that it will happen like the 13th May,

but nothing happens like the 13th May.

First of all, they themselves are not the actors on the spot,

since they are people who are on the retreat,

like the general of Gaulle said in his Allocution,

in 1958 they are people who are active, active officers,

and consequently, they are people who have the keys of power,

and who can weigh on Paris.

In Paris, it is certainly not...

they certainly are not in front of the general of Gaulle,

and they are the president René Coté, who is a very good president,

but who does not have the status and who does not have the firmness of the general of Gaulle.

Consequently, in what concerns the idea, to answer precisely your question,

the idea is to redo the 13th May and to succeed like the 13th May,

but it's failure.

So it's also obviously the announcement of a long process,

it's this Pouch, a long process on which you insist,

by saying that in fact there is a logic to that,

and it's the logic, it's the logic of what became the French army in Algeria,

the roles it had, the roles, especially political,

and you indicate if the army was politicized,

it's because they gave it police powers and a political role.

So can you maybe simply replace the logic that makes the army this force,

with this agency, we could say, clean,

in any case on the Algerian territory in 1961?

Yes, if you allow, let's go fast,

we will be able to talk about other things later.

I will go a little beyond the Algerian domain,

because in the end, the politicization of the army,

it is due, whether we want it or not, to the general of Gaulle.

It is he who, on June 18, 1940,

put himself outside the clubs, I can say,

put himself outside the military discipline

and that he decided not to submit,

and consequently, from that moment on,

the question will be asked within the army

on the fact of knowing who and how to obey.

And it is, by the way, an extremely interesting problem

during the World War II, 1940-1945,

and there comes a whole series of clashes,

of breaks within the army

that will, by the way, be affected

along the 4th Republic, in particular,

because of the Indochina War,

because the Indochina War is a war

that is led by successive governments

far from the metropolis, without the contingent,

and where the military who are there

and who are the best forces of the nation,

the best military forces of the nation,

have the conviction, I was going to say,

of the conviction, and it is true

that, in fact, the metropolis does not really support them.

And consequently, there is, at that moment,

again a break, which is seen

by the fact that the military power

is gradually opposed to the civil power,

which obviously adds to the crisis

of the European Union of Defense,

where, for example, Maréchal Joins

says that he does not agree,

and from there comes, consequently,

the canva of the military political crisis in Algeria,

or, in fact, which is a continuation

of all that I have just said,

that is to say, the Second World War,

the Indochina War, the A.C.D. crisis.

And then, it must be said,

it is serious during the Algerian War,

for a very simple reason,

is that, as the war continues,

it is wide, etc.,

the political power agrees more and more

to be able to alarm, in particular,

in 1956, with the special powers,

and of course, from that moment on,

the army will feel invested

by the political power,

but also on the spot,

a lot of action capacity,

and in addition, we charge it with a mission,

that is to say, to put an end to the rebellion,

to maintain the French presence in Algeria,

and obviously, for that,

we leave it more and more white cards,

especially since every time

they ask for reinforcements,

these reinforcements are agreed on,

in particular, in 1956,

with the call available,

with the increase in the number of calls on the field,

almost one and a half million men will arrive on the field,

that is to say, something extraordinary,

the army will become a political force,

not only by the weight,

the human mass,

which it is supposed to frame.

In addition, and of course, at a certain point,

the decisions taken by the political power

will put it on the line

in relation to what it thinks to be the right issue

of the Algerian War,

that is the case in 1957-58,

where the political power

lets go when the army

decides to reason the plane

that transports the five leaders of the rebellion

from Morocco to Tunisia,

and consequently,

how much the political power

and, in particular, a political power

held at that time by the Socialist Party,

SFIO, Guy Mollet,

renounced his authority

vis-à-vis the army.

Consequently, the political power

which was so imbued

of his being able to be his authority

in contemporary France

is losing its feet

and those who have the mastery

of the situation on the field in Algeria

is the army, a very strong army,

a army led by

quite remarkable military personnel

such as General Salant,

who was, after General Delade of Tassini,

the great man in Indochina,

who is the man of the teaching,

who is not at all marked on the right

as one might think,

on the contrary, since

shortly after being appointed to Algeria,

he is the object of an attack

because we suspect him

to be able to establish

relations with the rebels.

Salant, let's remind him,

we can already give the names

for those who are not familiar with the story,

it will be one of the four generals

with Charles Jouot Hezeler.

Absolutely.

So you have addressed a portrait of this army

politicized in a wide sense.

You may have to come back

on an important moment, the Indochina War,

because it is the place of a politicization

perhaps a little more particular

for a part of these frames,

which is the idea of revolutionary war.

If a part of these men are convinced

that a punch can be the way

to force the hand,

to force the hand of the Republic

so that Algeria remains French,

it is that they have taken

the conception of war, which is relatively new,

which has been forged in a large part

in Indochina, according to which

it is no longer a conventional war,

it is no longer a classical war,

it is a revolutionary war,

and they know how to lead it

when the political leaders are ready

to give up what could be won

by making a revolutionary war.

Can we come back to this moment

of crystallization of the new

conception of war

in a part of these militaries?

Yes, of course, these militaries

in the end are convinced

that they can win the war

because in the end

they have the weapons

that we give them to them,

they have the planes that we give them to them,

and in addition,

the United States

supports the French military forces

in Indochina, which is very important

because without the financial support of the United States,

France would not have been able to continue

the war for so long.

But what is going to happen

is that the French military

will discover that

they are fighting in a land

widely unknown

for most of them,

and that there is no doubt

that the fact of winning the territory

or killing men

who are the criteria of victory,

the criteria of victory,

they discover that it is the population

who is the key to victory.

That is to say that if a military force

does not have with it the population,

it is assured to lose the war.

In fact, the idea is that

the essential is the psychological war,

the revolutionary war,

the fact of convincing the populations

to be on the side,

on the good side, if I may say,

and that is the important point,

where a whole series of

ideas, concepts, doctrines

sometimes,

sometimes from what was

the Chinese Communist War

to obtain victory in 1949.

That is to say, a whole series of ideas

well implemented in Southeast Asia

and of course, this idea

of obtaining the consent of the population

is one of the essential elements

that the French military will retain

to fight during the Algerian War.

There is also another element

that is also being found during

this war in Indochina,

and not just that.

There, we are talking about the army

like a corps,

what is it,

but like a monolithic ensemble,

what for the moment it is not

and we will see that there are

very different ensembles,

very different weapons,

and in particular,

you have to say a word

of these very particular units

that are the parachutists,

because they will have a decisive role

obviously in the Putsch,

in the Putsch Tentative,

and even before that,

all this is still the

end of a long process,

and a process where the Paras

have become an extremely prestigious army,

extremely effective,

extremely glorified too,

so we can think of Bijar, etc.

who may be the most visible incarnation,

can we say a word

of what became the myth of the Paras

at the beginning of the 1960s?

So, if you allow me,

I will make a little nuance,

in the measure where

it is not the Paras as such

during the war in Indochina,

it will become

during the war in Indochina,

during the war in Algeria,

but during the war in Indochina

and afterwards during the war in Algeria,

it is rather the units

called foreign legions

in which there are

paratroopers units,

as, and it is above all not to forget,

at the time of the Putsch,

there will be units called

from the contingent,

who will be in the paratroopers forces,

in particular the 14th

and the 18th RCP,

these are regiments

of paratroopers hunters,

these are small guys from the contingent

who are said to be engaged in the paratroopers.

Consequently, you have to see the distinction.

As you know, during the war in Indochina,

there are no contingent men

and consequently they are above all

people of the career,

they are people who do

career in the army

and a good part of them

are men

of foreign legions

and consequently, yes,

indeed, there are paratroopers

and it will become

something very important

during the war in Algeria.

Obviously around

Bijard, who will

even have

a

who will even build

a real

a real myth

around

a part of his person,

other parts of his units,

with

uniforms, the Bijard helmet

in particular

in particular

a way

to be known

by

beautiful albums

of photos

which are broadcasted a little everywhere

and which constitute

in some way the myth

of the para-defender

of French Algeria

and indeed

they are the most often

these regiments

of paratroopers

who will be

spearheads

at the time of the barricades

and at the time of the Putsch

with, in particular, the first foreign regiment

of paratroopers.

So we will come to the Putsch itself

there is obviously a whole background

that holds to the evolution

of the general policy of Gaulle in the face of Algeria

and you do it very well in the book

especially during a long period

there is a certain equivocation

which ends up being raised

and it seems in the reading that

finally this Putsch intervenes in April 1961

because precisely for these

military who are going to launch themselves in the Putsch

it is there the moment when the contradiction collapses

they have the impression of being

in the train of winning the war

which seems to us a illusion

when it comes to the spirit of the Algerians

but in any case they have the impression

it seems to them a lot that

the opinion could be won

and exactly at that moment

Gaulle is acting

in metropolis

the principle of self-determination

and then the ones to speak who will soon open up

and you notice in the book

that a few weeks, a few days before the Putsch

Gaulle ordered to stop the offensive operations

and finally in the impression

that it is a little bit that which makes the tropeline

for a certain number of military who say

we are depriving ourselves of our victory

we are, if I take a term 14-18

to look back

while we are accomplishing this

why we have been sent

if you allow me

I would make a nuance

in the sense that

the war

if we can talk

so much about war

was in the process of being won

in any case it was the conviction

of a certain number of military

a year earlier

it was as

the great maneuvers of General Schall

who had put to the point

a strategy that was not

jump

in the measure

where

the

units

of the National Liberation Army

were

and that we know perfectly

by the memories

of a certain number of Algerian combatants

memories that come

that came out in particular the last year

that of Ben Tobal

who explained that

in 1960 in particular

the

Jounoud

that is to say the combatants

of the National Liberation Army

were literally terrorized

by the units

of the General Reserve

put in place by

in particular

by the parachutists

of General Schall and that

these units

which constituted catibas

of quite important units

were forced to sink

and

and consequently

the Jounouds had the impression

of being terrorized in particular

by the use of a terrible weapon

in terms

of war

counter-revolutionary

it's the helicopters

and consequently in 1960

yes

it's true that

people have the impression

of winning the French military

they have the impression of having

the victory at the end of the path

and

a very clear integration

it's the fact that

some great military leaders

of two villages

have brought

to see Gaulle

to tell him

that

he wishes

indeed a ceasefire

that he wishes a relief

of the conditions

of ceasefire

and all this

is going to escalate for many reasons

for internal reasons

in France

but we don't have the time to think about it

international reasons because

more and more there is an international pressure

on France

and thanks to the diplomacy

of the FLN in particular

an international pressure

thanks to the different General Assembly

of the UN

each year

and also the fact that

we see that Gaulle's General

as the months go by

we have enough

of this war that continues

and the fact that we don't end up

with a solution

to seek

from the summer of 1960

in this way

a way to get out of the war

by talking

he clearly says it

I wanted to

because

as you can imagine

an extraordinary debate

on what he said

what he didn't say about Gaulle

and how he was injured

etc.

as you have probably seen

I made a three page

where I indicate with

extracts of the allocutions

what is

in this photo

of the cover that I chose

and which is extraordinary

it is an absolutely essential moment

we are in full

Bled

it is the turn of the Bopots

and Gaulle explains

to these military

officers who are extremely varied

we see it

with the different Kepics

but in the presence of Mesmer

and of the worker

he explains

Pierre Mesmer is the Minister of Arms

and Paul de L'ouvrier

general delegate of the government

he explains that

it's very good

you are winning the war

it's very good but it's not enough

the Algerians

are not the Bretons

they are not the Eurins

they will have to find a solution

that France remains in Algeria

yes, he says

but we can't do it

it means that

he begins

in a fairly

fine way

but still very difficult

when we talk about the military

he begins to tell them

be careful

don't make this war

your war

the French army

must do something else

that you fight in Algeria

you may have to

play elsewhere

of your

strength

and consequently

it is important

that you don't

concentrate

you don't devote yourself

to win the war in Algeria

and as much as you say

that all this is connected with another

international context

and the fact that de Gaulle has other priorities

at that moment, he doesn't just think of Algeria

he thinks of nuclear bombs

nuclear bombs

he thinks of the position of France

within the time

and above all what you are saying

is that there is a communication phase

on the international scene

and that de Gaulle has a kind of conscience

and that of course

he starts to make choices

at that moment

yes, in reality

let's be clear

his choice is made

his choice is made

but

during a certain number of months

he left

the army

to play his vatou

and we can see that

after the barricades

January 1960

after the processes

that took place during the year

following

the internal political movement

which shows

how much the French population

has enough

of this Algerian war

let's not forget

that the calls of the contingent

stay 28 months

that is to say that during

almost 3 years

they leave

and stay in Algeria

to fight some of them

and consequently

the population

and obviously the political parties

know that this war must stop

and on our side

as you said

there is the other front

that is to say the diplomatic front

we are in the middle of a cold war

de Gaulle has the conviction

that France must manifest

he managed to

explode the first atomic bomb

on February 13, 1960

in Sahara

explosions will continue

during these years

but for him

what matters

it is not the fact to keep Algeria

it is not the fact

to maintain the face of France

and to be really

one of the four great powers

since she is a member of the Security Council

and consequently

it is very important to see

how much de Gaulle

will gradually

make a priority

behind the other

that is to say the priority

for him is foreign policy

and the power of France

and what becomes less a priority

is to win the war in Algeria

and consequently he will be obliged

to want to help Algeria

to want

without getting rid of it

he said he has very hard words

about Algeria

who supports him

and he can no longer

he can no longer support

the fact that Algeria comes back

constantly on the demand of the scene

while he has decided

to grow

in the United States, the Soviet Union

and so we come to these military

who against

this Gaul vision

in an abandoned program of Algeria

of an independent future

of self-determination

now inscribed in the political priorities

they will do everything to keep Algeria

French to go to the end of what they consider

their mission

these military are both generals

they are the most known, it is this famous Carteron

we talk about Gaul in his allocation

and then there are also colonels, captains, lieutenants

there are different levels in the Putschists

how it is organized

how it is prepared the Putsch

who is in confidence, who organizes it

so the Putsch

he succeeded

because he was improvised

he failed

because he was improvised

that is to say that he was not well

prepared at all

we sometimes have the impression

of pienniquet

it is thus that

at the time of the Putsch

there are two colonels who arrive

to lie with

a

a napkin with many

confidential documents

they have to go to a place

lack of luck

the person is gone

and he stays in carafe

they can no longer find

an accommodation

of course

even if

I would say maybe

we do not know that there will be a Putsch

at that time

the police

the military security

the general information

are in sight

because there is a certain number of colonels

captains who since

December 1960

were spotted

and were invited to go to metropole

or in Germany and not to be in Algeria

so these two colonels

arrive

they are forced to look for an accommodation

they find it and at that time

they are forgotten

in the president

with all the confidential documents

in short there are pienniquet

there are

at the point of view of

arrangements that are made

of course there are people

who know what they are doing

the first foreign

market

the paratrooper

there are people

who know how to

to disarm the CRS

disarm the armed people

escalate the grid

of the summer palace

and end what they want

on the field

if I can say

functional on the field

they succeed perfectly

but it is extremely bad

prepared in particular

they did not think at all

that if they engage

in a conflict with the metropole

but Algeria without the metropole

is completely lost

there is a such

sailing boat

plane etc.

that if everything is cut

at the end of the moment

so all this

is quite mediocre

at the point of view of the organization

and even if

they sometimes had

the idea that

agents of the CIA

could say that

they would support

the people of the Putsch

all this is not

very serious

and all this is not very serious because

they

consider that

since

De Gaulle makes difficulties

for military integration

in time

well the Americans

and in particular Kennedy

helped them

in such a way that they could

negotiate the fact of the support

of the American support for a French Algeria

against the fact that

France will no longer have difficulty

concerning time

it is obviously once again

a illusion why

simply because

we know perfectly that Kennedy

in 1956 had made a great speech

taking part for the independence

of Algeria we see badly

in 1971

he would have supported

the French Algeria

but then it's fascinating because

what you indicate is that

he has both failed and missed this Putsch

you do not have to go under silence either

where he succeeded, that is to say

they still held more or less

in a certain measure at the time

for a few days and some nights

and there you go

can we describe what succeeded

that is to say they even have a technical point of view

why did it succeed

where did they succeed

infiltrate

and why they were not stopped

before holding

certainly the essential was saved

since the metropolis was planned

and it triggered

the final failure of the Putsch

but they still managed to stop

the capital of the French department

from power

why and why did they not stop

so

there are of course several reasons

the first is what I indicated

that is to say

because

it was not planned

it was not

predictable more exactly

you described somewhere that we expected

a strong blow

but

we did not know when

it would be

and it's

a prototype

of the question of teaching

more we are used

to the idea that there will be something

and that we receive

teaching saying attention

it's for tomorrow, it's for tomorrow

or it's for next month

and more

political authorities

start to look at things

with more

skepticism

or fatality

and the proof itself

when the Putsch was triggered

the army minister

Pierre Mesmer

we can imagine

that he was extremely

informed of everything that was going on

in Algeria

by the multiple teaching services

that he had

being an official trip

to Morocco

for the return of the sand

of Maréchal Lioté

we can imagine that

we had the idea that

Pierre Mesmer

would not be part of Paris

therefore

one of the reasons

of the result is the fact that

the surprise

the surprise is an

essential element of the strategy

and from this point of view

things work perfectly

indeed

what happens is that

the unit of parachutists

that is to say those of the commandos

parachutists

those of the first foreign regime

of parachutists

those of the first foreign regime

of cavalry

manage to

invest all the power

in particular

the Palais d'Été

in particular the general government

of Algeria

what is called the GG

and they give

the General Delegate

Morin

he had with him

a minister of the government

Robert Buron

and also Coffrey

General Gambies

who is an extraordinary man

because he is at the same time

recurring

in his way of being

I know a certain name of this person

so for me it represents

something very

extraordinary

he decides

when he is the General

General in Algeria

who succeeded

in difficult conditions

to General Crépin

he decides to leave

and to continue

the units of parachutists

that arrive from Zeralda

on Algiers

and there is a kind of shock

both the shock of generations

and Gambies

is put in the state of arrest

him too

and they are all sent

in southern Algeria

although there is a surprise

there is the fact that

the Unites

are perfectly

in measure

to circumvent

all the authorities

and in particular the telephone

and in particular the radio

the third reason

is that

the units

that were charged

to defend the Republic

which were

the CRS and the Gendarmes

I do not say

that these units

have

passed in the reverse

but we let them do

we let them do for

a whole series of reasons

but one of the essential reasons

is that

the army does not shoot

the French do not shoot the French

and consequently

from that moment on

there is a single man

who is dead

in front of the radio

but there is no

bloody confrontation

it is still absolutely extraordinary

we are far

from the Puts which take place

in other countries where there is

bloodshed

no, no, no

it is an event

that is not solved

by murderers

and murderers

and murderers

there is something fascinating

what you are telling is that

there is a tactical knowledge

located in Algeria in particular

for the Puts

they have the hand on the different levers of power

but so that the Puts

is a somewhat significant strategic port

it would have been necessary to make sure

that Aoran to Constantin would follow

and that in Paris too, there would be relays

and from this point of view

it seems that it is much less well prepared

and that the Puts

either did not take enough assurance

or were a little in the illusion

on what it would be possible to do

here it is two other dimensions

the rest of Algeria and the metropolis

here it is still quite a quick failure

but they were not well prepared

they were a little

the Riolo

it is true that on the side of the metropolis

things were not well prepared

at all and not at all

and in particular

we have some trouble

and I must say

that from this point of view

I do not know if I would make a fourth edition

but we do not know

I did not succeed

and it is a failure

on my part anyway

for the moment I did not succeed

to go to the end

to know

what was behind

the plot of Paris

it was yes

there are guys

there are people we know

people who are more or less

marked on the right

among the internationalists

but finally there were

people who said

behind

Jacques Sustel

Georges Bidot

I had not interviewed

he has denied everything

Jacques Sustel

wrote a beautiful letter that I kept

by indicating

that at no time

in any way

he was linked to whatever

he was put there in whatever way

what is contradicted by

many other things

he is sure

he is likely

that there are archives

that are hidden somewhere

maybe abroad

where we would have

revelations in particular

about these policies

and maybe other policies

I do not say more

so yes

indeed there is this problem

of the metrology

there is also the problem

of the other

regions of Algeria

the black Constantine

who was there where there was the most

of force because

of the Tunisian border

and of the Moris line

and their year

on the side of the black Constantine

is the general Gouraud

who is at the head of the

Constantine Army Corps

and who will be one of the

elements that will make

that he does not stop

to hesitate

and to go from the acceptance

to the refusal

and it is an extremely

extremely painful thing

for him because

he is manifestly torn

and for

all his entourage

because he will spend the four days

to go

from an acceptance to a refusal

and obviously

one of the reasons for which the black Constantine

will not stop

on the side of their year

he is the general of Puy

that I knew

that I was able to go see

that I interviewed

who is a man who

basically

he was for the putsch

he was more exactly

let's not say

things that would go beyond his thought

he was for the maintenance

of the French presence in Algeria

and consequently

against what the general

of Gaulle wanted

but it was a legalist

it was a man who

did not want to let

the French army

become

a army of

pronunciament

and consequently

after having hesitated

he will decide

to let

the place

to be subordinated

to show

that he does not agree with the putsch

and that he does not want

that all the body of an orange

passes on the side of the putsch

consequently, yes on this side

one of the

elements of the failure

is the fact that

except the Algerian

the black Constantine

and the Raneuil

did not follow

and the fact that

there were two paratroopers divisions

who walked in the

business did not

make the army

basculate in its entirety

so if you have to

but that's what is totally fascinating

is that there are many tragic characters in this story

in which we feel that they are completely

torn and they make faces and it's

really the spring

in the case in which we see that this is what

made the putschist mistakes at many times

so if you have to enter

what happened

the reasons for which it failed

in any case in the future of the putsch

it tells you that there is a reason that appears

very evident to everyone is

the discourse of De Gaulle

it is De Gaulle, his person and his televised discourse

which is quite fascinating

because in history we have taken the habit

of studying deep causes, structures etc

and there we have almost the impression

that we are going to have to do an event

or a character who changes the story

more or less autonomously

an event in the monster

so here is what you can

situate the real importance

of this discourse, of this take of De Gaulle's words

with this incredible text

of the chapter on general retreat

and its consequences

De Gaulle's discourse is

obviously important

obviously important

but it is important

at the same time

by his content

but also by his

by the moment he is pronounced

in reality

De Gaulle himself

hesitate to speak

you know that

at the time of the barricades

in January 1960

he had taken the word

for the first time

with a result

of about nothing

and consequently

the question was asked

in other words

it is not necessary

to minimize the fact

that De Gaulle is deeply

affected by

the punch

and the fact that

these people are

in measure

of basculating France

as you know

De Gaulle

is a man who

is a family of great involved

but he is also

sensitive to

cyclotomy and depression

and here

he has a crisis

he says it to Bernard Rico

they are going to the end

they have the support of the Americans

and if it is like that

the Americans

will enter the game

and since the Americans

enter the game the Soviets

and it will be a world war

that is to say that he always sees

he sees the worst

but

he is going to take it back

because

I wanted to show

the agenda of General De Gaulle

and all the people who receive

the Sunday agenda

during the Sunday

and in particular

the presidents of the assemblies

etc.

and he has an idea

which is caressed

for a certain time

because he had

beautiful to say that

in 1958

but I do not know at 67

that I will become a dictator

but De Gaulle

the concern

of the authority

and the authority

he has with one article

of the constitution article 16

and he sees all of a sudden

that thanks to this push

he will be able to put in the application

article 16 so he asks

their opinion to the president of the assemblies

to the president of the constitutional council

to the ministers

these people are far from being absolutely

all agree etc.

and De Gaulle

in the Sunday agenda

receives in particular

Jacques Chabonzalmas

who tries to re-conflict

who is the president of the assembly

absolutely

and he will

decide to make a speech

obviously

as it is something that is oral

we can not

show

but De Gaulle's speech

this

the script of De Gaulle

for this allocation is extraordinary

he

he ratures

he constantly corrects

his text

he

he makes sure to make a text

really

extremely precise

and he will

he will decide

at the end of the afternoon

a coursel

which is the general secretary of the Elysée

he says to the coursel

come from television

and he makes his speech

an insurrectionary power

is established

in Algeria by an ancient

military mentor

the culprits

of the use of passion

have exploited

the passion of the frames

of certain special units

the passion

inflamed

of a part of the population

of European sources

and quarrels

and myths

the power

of the responsible

submerged

by the military conjuration

this power

to an appearance

a cartel of generous retreats

he has a reality

a group

of partisan

officers

ambitious

and fanatic

this group

and this cartel

have

limited

and expeditious

but

he sees

and knows

the nation

that deformed

through their frenzy

their enterprise

can only lead to a national disaster

Yes, so you ask me the question

how is it

it makes me mad

so first of all

it makes me mad because

it doesn't happen

immediately

at the time of the coup

it happens at the time when everyone hesitates

it happens when

in Algeria, in particular

Gouraud

the officers

hesitate and wonder

what will happen on the side of Paris

we must not forget

that we are not in the current conditions

communication

communication is cut off

we try to hang on

there are the secret services

the archives

from this point of view are extraordinary

we see how

we try to hang on to anything

from the point of view of communication

we can simply say there are rumors

you tell the incredible rumors

we would have seen planes pass to Paris

with the paratroopers

will the paratroopers land on the capital

it's a moment of incredible psychosis

Sunday

and especially during the night

Sunday to Monday

but that's after

the court of Gaulle

where

in the end he takes the word

at an important moment

and where he says things

clear and clear

first he ridicules the men of the pouch

quarter of the general

in retreat

doing

sort of sending them to the retreat

again we see the difference

with 58

on the other hand

he takes care

to indicate

it's an

event that is

putting

all that he was doing

and

he also calls

the French to support him

it's quite

original

it's rare

that Gaulle is called the French

to support him

he tells them help me

it's extremely strong

French

see

where the risk of going

France

in relation

to what was your

return

French

help me

and it's

an important

moment

important

and that's the important

point says that

from that moment

since it's a power

illegal

which

it's illegal authorities

who have taken power in Algeria

well

he delights from the duty

of obeying all the military

who are

who could be on their side

from that moment

there is a real problem

of consciousness like that

of 1940

and the people

whether it's the officers

or the callers

will feel distraught

from their duty of discipline

and from that moment

that the callers

who are very many in Algeria

will play an important role

in the eyes of their officers

showing that

they are not ready

to be

the laborer

for a push

there are obviously

among them

militants

on the side of the Christian syndicalism

there are communist militants

but also there are

a whole series of people

who are intellectuals

who refuse to play

and who will

either sabotage

what the officers

want to do

or take advantage of the fact that the officers hesitate

and consequently

they will put

a grain of sand in the machine

and that's what will make

the push go down

during the day of Monday

there is something absolutely fascinating

there is a lot of disobeying

since we have officers who disobey

because of the republican legality

and De Gaulle who calls

men to disobey the officers who disobey

and each one in his way in 1961

is playing again in 1940

since the act of the founder of the gollism

is precisely a disobeying

of a military to the order

in the name of a superior cause

so as well the pushists who disobey

think to redo the gesture of De Gaulle

that is to say disobey, in the name of legitimacy

to leave the legality because it is legitimate

to continue a fight

De Gaulle he invokes

on the contrary to the legality and legitimacy

to say to the officers of the contingent

to disobey the disobeying

so there it is something that each one

finally and brought almost to be decided

while in an army

functioning well, there would simply be orders

respected from the top of the chain

there it is the inverse that is produced

and in some way twice before an interval

it is absolutely right

I agree with what you just said

I have nothing better to add

maybe just to get back to it

it seems to me that there is another rejection

of 1940 or rather 1942

in this push

is that it makes some old clivage

some old fight, in particular between

army of Africa and free French

between gyrodists, selfish

the spectrum also of the torches operation

where the French had fired on the French

and that finally what happens in Algiers in 1961

it has reemerged in a certain number of things

that could have been traumatisms

or things that will continue to fight for the military of this time

absolutely

several times

because fortunately in the archives

that I have been able to consult

there is one that consists

of knowing what was said

in the Council of Ministers

De Gaulle

several times said

it's Vichy, it's Vichy

it's Vichy that reemerges

so yes absolutely

the Second World War

reemerges on the occasion of the

reemerges of

but if we also enter

we talked about it

and we said that it was generals

at the retreat

but you may insist on the fundamental

heterogeneity of who are

these pushists between the head

generals, the five stars

against what you have

it's an expression that comes in the book

five stars against four gallows

against colonels

but also captains

who are much closer to the troop

much closer to the men

obviously much more training capacity

but are also much less taking part

to the planning

and have much less their word to say

on the conduct of events and we have the impression

that we almost want to do another scenario

where it would have been captains or colonels

as we have seen from elsewhere

who would have done the push and or maybe

that there would have been other springs

in any case there would have been a unity

a cohesion maybe stronger

the summits of the operation

in any case

I had very well analyzed the things

it's true that there are basically

three generations

the generation of the generals

who are at the retreat

and sometimes for a long time

there are the generations of the colonels

who have done Indochina

and who have most often been

melded to the fight of the Second World War

and then there are

the lieutenant and the captain

they are on the field

they are the ones who fight alongside the men

and it is obvious

that these are the lieutenant and the captain

to whom we said

you have to keep

Algeria in France

you have to keep the French presence in Algeria

they are the

most curious, the most arduous

they are

in particular a certain number of them

who will enter the west

because they feel proud

not by gold

but by the colonels

and by the generals

and therefore yes, indeed

there is one of the reasons

of the failure of the putsch

and also the fact that

it is the aggregate

of several generations of military

who do not all have the same ideas

the same goals

the same ambitions

and the same experience

very different

between the generals

and the air

who started

except for my part

his career during the Great War

and

people who

came to the army

almost at the end of the China War

and who are there

and for them the Algerian War

must be won because we lost the China War

but if we have to

do something

we have to win the Algerian War

because she can win

I almost understood

what we have seen

the fact that often the putsch are made by

colonels and captains and not by the generals

and that in fact there are very concrete reasons

and very practical

talking about the generals

can we say a little word about General Chal

on which he has a lot to rest

including from the memorial

because many people then say

that he did not plan things well

at the same time it seemed quite obvious

at the time when it happened

that it was him at the head of this operation

of this putsch

what can we say a little word

not to retrace his career but the way

he managed himself

it's a few days from April 1961

the poor

he often had health problems

and in particular

at that time

he had one

it's a general republican

first of all it's a general of the army of the air

it's a general who was

very close to the men

of the republican front

Maurice Bourges de Naurie

he was the man of Suez

he was the man who negotiated

with the israelis

and the britans

he was the man who

manifestly

was the rising star

in the french army

he was chosen

by de Gaulle

to replace the general

Salant in november

december 1958

and it's

an aviator and meanwhile

we put him at the head of an army

composed

at 80% of the men of the army

of the earth and the men of the army

of the earth will have a great

admiration for him because

he puts

an extremely simple strategy

that consists

of dividing the army in two

on the one hand the units of what we call

the framework

that is to say those who maintain

the authority on the field

who do all the jobs

who are there

to monitor

the important

places

who are there to encadre

the schools

who are there to play the nurses

the social assistants etc

so the mass

called them but on our side

there is what we call the

reserves, the reserve units

composed essentially

of the paratrooper unit

or of the legionnaire

and who are there

to be walked from one side

to the other from Algeria

to sink on the

units of the helene

starting in the west

since the west

was the most

the quietest region of Algeria

to go

to the west

and succeed

to annihilate

the units of the helene

as I told you

the Algerians

at a given moment

during the 1960s

they did not know how to shoot

a very big disarray

during

the helene rounds

and therefore

Charles succeeded

general republican

general of the army of the air

commander-in-chief

extremely well

considered

and who

is certain to bring

the army to his victory

and then who

is considered

by De Gaulle

who estimates that it was not

quite firm

in the case of the barricades

and

at that moment

De Gaulle will have the idea

that he must

not kill him but

get him out of Algeria

because he did

of the Algerian War

in particular it is him

to integrate

more and more of the unit of Archi

Archi being a generic term

in the French forces

because he had a line

that it was necessary

that the Algerians

be also combatant units

against the units of the helene

and therefore

it is him who chose

because of his

his status

of his gals

he

he decides but

he must say it to the heart

and that's why

it's him who

will help the most easily

especially more than

next to him there are

colonels who are perfectly

aware of the fact that

in the end the entire army does not follow

and that Charles

can not continue

a fight that they estimate

of the advance

then you have to enter the valley

and this immense valley

because of the pudge

because at the moment

I really think it's an event

that keeps traces and stigmas

until today in the French armies

I really think it's an event that has not been forgotten

but if we start

by the immediate after

and what we will call the purgations

but the purgations

we will be well limited

when we are hit, when we see

the gravity, when we see the danger

when we see the concern that was

in Paris and we see in front

the punitions, the sanctions

there is not much anyway

I do not agree

first there are thousands

of officers

who leave the army

either because they are half

either because they issue themselves

because they do not want

anymore

not immediately

yes, yes, yes

I can tell you, for example

an important character

Ely

he had before

the pudge

he had understood that things

did not work

and he had decided to go see

on the private sector what he could do

and then he finds that

that beard

he comes back and he has the misfortune

to be the commander

in seconds of the first

foreign budgetary regime

at the time of the pudge and consequently

he is the one who will go

but I can tell you

that even before the pudge

there are a lot of officers

who have decided to leave the army

or do something else

there are some numbers who will go

or to Katanga

where I found them when I made

my report on the death of

and then

Mezmer

and De Gaulle do everything

they can to push

all these people to the door

because they want to restructure

the army anyway they want a more

tight army they want a army

of

managers and no more

of military on the field

they want this army to be

less numerous

and they want the army to be

founded on the technology

the technology of the bomb

and no more on the fact of going to run

the Jebel and all that

if I may be wrong to say

what I indicated is

that there are

sorrows that are pronounced

but in fact

there are things

there is a will of rigor in particular

of the part of De Gaulle and we have the impression

that at each step

people who come around him to tell him

to think about it

it would be necessary to be clement

to be careful as well on people

that on certain units that we talk about

Dissoud for example the 13th of the BLE

we just told him

there is an impressive story

between the extremely severe will

of De Gaulle for which the Putschers are

detractors obviously and they are

and at the same time the way it is

concretized administratively

and on people and on the units

where it will take a lot more time

to process what you indicated

Yes but

it is not necessary to forget one thing

is that if we had let De Gaulle

I mean

if he had acted

all alone

what he did not

and we have an illusion

because I have not yet

worked a lot on him

all that

in fact

De Gaulle is not De Gaulle

it seems like people around him

who can have their influence

and there

there are people who have

political men, generals

who have had an influence

quite beneficial

it would have been a disaster

literally for France

if De Gaulle

had not been influenced

in the sense of

the execution

of the capital penalty for the general joua

it would have been

a real disaster for France

that there is a capital execution

of a man

as a joua

and from this point of view

we can clearly see

that the ministers

Jean Foyer, Georges Pompidou

and others

played the role

of what we call

an entourage

Messmer played a role

of the former legionnaire

in the affairs of the

of the legionnaire

so

you have to see

the gravity of the events

and you also have to see

the fact that

there is a need

of a gathering of the French nation

of the fact that

at a given moment

at a certain given moment

you have to reconcile

with these people

and these people

remain convinced that they were right

that they had to keep the French Algeria

but on our side

it is not them

who won

and consequently

De Gaulle

has helped

and he knows in a very ironic way

for example

Jean Foyer that I well known

and who was the Minister of Justice

Guard Desceaux

who had pushed De Gaulle

to not execute

to not execute

the sanction against

De Gaulle

to say

so

you absolutely want

the execution

of the game

I give you the paper saying that I agree

so that

it is hardly better

absolutely

De Gaulle was

obviously not

well aware of what he said

the role of the entourage

the role of those

who surround the leaders

who are in power

this role is

to show

to where they can go

and the limits of things

so you have to be careful

yes of course

you have to listen to people

but people were in prison

and there were

executions following the attacks

on that

and a little glamour

it is a book that was published

in 1983

almost 20 years after the event

with a lot of interviews

with the actors of the time

you came back because there were new archives

can we also say that you came back

because it is a particular story

something that is not an academic

subject for you

there is both a return on archives

and a return on the past lived

yes I did not play a big role

be persuaded

be ...

I had the chance

in 1983 when I came

to support my doctoral thesis

to be

requested by André Versailles

who is a wonderful man

an extraordinary editor

who rarely did

and who had launched

a collection, The Memory of the Sky

by the way

where he requested

historians

to write on a subject

of their choice

and he gave me

the possibility

the opportunity to write

by analyzing

by asking me what I wanted to write

I had written

on the problems of the war

between the two

and as he

knew that I was

born in Algeria and that I was black

suddenly came the idea

to work on the pouch

and that's how I worked on the pouch

while I had no idea

to work on

the Algerian War

or this event

at that moment I was

extraordinarily helped

by the General Christian

who is the head of the

History Service of the Armée de l'Aire

and who, contrary to all

legality, opened the archives

which were the ones

that he had

received himself

from General Charles and General Jouot

and which were interviews

where I published

and obviously

without quoting the source etc.

so it was a first

that fascinated me

but

in 2010-2011

André Versailles

again, who had

Elas

whose

the edition house was no longer complex

but was André Versailles' edition

asked me to come back on the subject

and there I found

an absolutely extraordinary archive

in the archives

in particular of the History Service

of the Defense

of stupid things

because

we must not forget

that in 1983

we were under the reign of the law

of 1978, the archive law

and that in 2010-2011

we were

under the reign of the law of 2008

which was an extraordinary

liberal law, contrary to all that we said

because it opened

very widely and

I had access

to exceptional documents

I even

took on me

not to quote systematically

everything I had noted

because there were

for example

list of agents

of the outside security

OES agents

which were quietly indicated in all the papers

that I could have

at my disposal

I had a lot of pleasure

to work for the second edition

but unfortunately

the editorial constraints

made that André Versailles

had to cede

his house

and that this work had almost

no sequel

I

asked the question

to Bernard Gottlieb

boss of Lige Jacob

for a third edition

and

he was a bit hesitant

as it was a third edition

but I told him that

on the one hand

I had new archives

that I could see

which was

much more difficult to see than in 2009-2010

because

in the meantime it was passed

to Frostay who was

the IGAI

the Interministerial General Instruction

who was working on

the archives

of the most profitable constraints

and I had to fight

against

this IGAI

but I found

possibilities

to counter it

by private archives

which were

great things, in particular

the General Vésimé

who commanded the Corps d'Armes d'Alger

imagine how much

some of these archives are rich

and not only about the character

in question

but about the rest

so I was very lucky

I also had something

which is interesting because it can give

ideas to the researchers

is that after the first edition

and the second edition

I had letters

answers from the courier

coming from a number of people

who had brought me

not only their reactions

but also their testimonies

and in particular

I had a poutchiste

who came to see me and told me

I have a whole series of documents

to pass on to you

if you want to take advantage of

and so

I had this

and on top of that

I was able to work in the

private papers of Pierre Racine

who was the head of the cabinet of Michel de Bré

who

Pierre Racine was for

the independence of Algeria

because Michel de Bré was not

especially for the independence of Algeria

and

in all of this

I found an admirable text

which is called Adieu l'Algérie

and I wanted to

include with the Corps de la Famille

in the end of my book

because

it is a kind of

of

of goodbye

of Pierre Racine who had a lot of knowledge

of Algeria, who had worked a lot

for Algeria and in Algeria

and

this

this very beautiful text

on the 14th of July

1962

made me think

about the distribution of the prizes

at the Lissier-Bujaud

which had been students

from the 6th to

the Ipocani

and where the distribution

of prizes was made

at the cost of military music

and of this country

in great red equipment

sabre-clair

and therefore for me

the booklet was a booklet

Thank you very much Maurice Mayis

so thank you very much for your interview

thank you very much for this book

the last edition

in 2021

I said it because

we were talking about it

really like an adventure novel

because we did not have the time to talk about it

but in the middle of that there is also an atomic explosion

in the middle of the pooch

with stories like Bolesk

you have to hide the charges

in one of the horses

it's great

and we were also told that it was going to be a good adaptation

to the visual god

if Netflix is listening to us

it was the father's son

a podcast produced co-animated by Alexandre Jublain

and André Loréz is distributed by a big studio

thank you very much André

thank you Alexandre, thank you Maurice Mayis

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